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Indeed, the South African Law Commission and the African National Congress intended to include such an economic policy in the Bill of Rights, even though this is not the function of such a document.9 During the debates on the Equality
Bill the importance of the economy was stressed again.?1 The choice of a market economy necessarily has an impact on the approach to racial equality. The economy, by its very nature, is driven by competition and thus cannot allow for an outcome where all would have the same standing. What the definition should have included instead is a policy of equality of opportunity that would allow all to stand on an equal footing when they set off for some goal or benefit." However, according to this definition, equal opportunity means the opportunity to compete for something and to earn it through productive effort. This definition may give the impression that it does not produce more overall equality as it creates a broader and stiffer competition. But that does not show that arguments for equality of outcome are justified. Equal opportunity means equal socially imposed obstacles. The (allegedly) inegalitarian effect which is created is the consequence of the deserved fruits gained by efforts of some-having competed under equal conditions. The situation is not in conflict with substantive equality since the interpretation of equal opportunity explicitly leaves room for individual development. This individual development does not need to be justified separately.'2 And it would be counter-productive to exclude this individuality by aiming at equality of outcome.
The majority of philosophers agree that there is an obligation-although to varying degrees-on the responsibility of the state or society to create such a situation. 13 12 Goldman, above, uses the (indirect) justification of the possibility of desert which has to be achieved through fair procedures as a further justification besides equality. However, the inclusion of fair procedures as an additional condition is not really necessary because equal socially imposed obstacles already covers that point. If the procedures were not fair, then the socially imposed obstacles would not be equal. Section 7 prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race specifically:
"Subject to section 6, no person may unfairly discriminate against any person on the ground of race, including-(a) the dissemination of any propaganda or idea, which propounds the racial superiority or inferiority of any person, including incitement to, or participation in, any form of racial violence; (b) the engagement in any activity which is intended to promote, or has the effect of promoting, exclusivity, based on race; (c) the exclusion of persons of a particular race group under any rule or practice that appears to be legitimate but which is actually aimed at maintaining exclusive control by a particular race group; (d) the provision or continued provision of inferior services to any racial group, compared to those of another racial group; (e) the denial of access to opportunities, including access to services or contractual opportunities for rendering services for consideration, or failing to take steps to reasonably accommodate the needs of such persons." The two-step test adopted
In determining whether unfair discrimination on this ground has taken place the courts need to apply a two-stage enquiry. Firstly, they need to examine whether discrimination on the ground of race has taken place, and then, secondly, The examination on this second step is inevitably wide-ranging. It is concerned with the impact on the complainant as well as factors that touch on reasonableness and justifiability. In prescribing such a procedure, the Act departs from the initial course set by the Constitution of curtailing the potential scope of the equality right. The following will analyse this problem more closely.
The Constitutional Court has also developed a two-step test to determine unfair discrimination within section 9. It first examines whether discrimination has taken place and then whether such discrimination is unfair. Since discrimination on the ground of race is a specified ground in the Constitution as well, the presumption of unfairness has to be rebutted by the respondent 20 This is the effect of s. 13(2)(a) EA. 21 S. l(1)(viii) EA. 22 According to the constitutional guarantee, discrimination on the grounds of race is deemed to be unfair since race is a specified ground; see s. 9(5) read with subsection (3) of the Constitution; The Equality Act aims at the same regulation, however not in such straightforward terms. Section 13 states: "(2) If the discrimination did take place-(a) on a ground in paragraph (a) of the definition of 'prohibited grounds', then it is unfair, unless the respondent proves that the discrimination is fair;" Section l(l)(xxii)(a) then lists race as the first specified ground. Thus, if in a racial discrimination case that is examined within the constitutional equality guarantee it is found that unfair discrimination has taken place, the further question arises as to whether there is in these circumstances any justification for it under section 36. There should be a strict distinction between the analysis of unfairness and the examination of a justification within a limitation of the right.
The justification of an infringement should take place in a separate, third step. Any other approach would make section 36 redundant for, if reasonableness and justifiability were meant to be tested as an element of unfairness, there would be no need for the separate provision in section 36. Nevertheless, already in the first equality cases the Constitutional Court has struggled with this distinction. It considered the intention of an act, public reaction and administrative inconvenience as relevant in the analysis of unfairness23 even though these factors would seem to relate to the question whether or not there is a positive reason for limiting the equality right. As in South Africa, the Canadian Charter guarantees non-discrimination24 and stipulates limits to the right in terms of its justification. Section 1 states: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
The Canadian Supreme Court has recognized the importance of keeping the two sections analytically distinct.25
By combining reasonableness and justifiability within the rebuttal of unfairness, the Equality Act erases the distinction that the Constitution has made. That has several potentially devastating effects. The reversal of the burden of proof provision, which is the same as the constitutional clause, is weakened considerably by such a broad understanding of "unfairness". The effect is that the defendant can discharge the presumption of unfairness not only by showing that the discrimination was "fair" in a narrow sense, but simply by testifying that there was a legitimate purpose and that there was no less-restrictive means to reach that purpose. In consequence the initial force of the guarantee of racial equality becomes practically worthless.26 Furthermore, jurisprudentially there is a big difference between finding that an act does not infringe the equality guarantee, and finding that it does infringe the guarantee but that the limitation which it contains is justified. While the court order in both instances may be the same, the two legal routes have differing impacts on the scope of the equality right. A finding that an act does not infringe the racial equality guarantee reduces the scope of the right so that it excludes the class of cases exemplified by that particular act. However, a finding that the act infringes the racial equality guarantee but that the infringement is justified, means that the right usually prohibits such acts but that in the particular case the guarantee is set aside 'for the higher value of the common good. The latter route leaves more room for corrective policies, as well as measures for situations which may not be foreseeable at the moment.
The Equality Act has therefore, through its approach to testing unfair discrimination, limited the scope of the equality right. The situation might have been slightly different if the Act applied only to relations between private persons because the Constitution allows a limitation only in terms of a law of general application. Indeed section 7 of the Act does not mention the State as a violator but rather discriminatory acts by one person against another person although the State is mentioned in the general discrimination prohibition in section 6.
A drafting disaster
To enable victims of racial discrimination to protect themselves against the violation of their rights, they need to be able to understand them. On the other hand, the content of the legislation must not be over-simplistic as that would lead to extensive legal challenges to clarify the legal situation. The Act as it stands, however, is neither simple nor clear. Once again, the under-educated majority, especially in the rural areas, is disadvantaged.
The provisions of the Act also appear repetitive. This conclusion can be drawn regarding the prohibition of race discrimination as well as the determination of its unfairness. Section 6 proclaims the general prohibition of unfair discrimination stating that neither the State nor any person may unfairly discriminate against any person.27 Section 7 then prohibits discrimination on the grounds of race specifically listing some examples.28 Additionally, the definition of "prohibited grounds" lists race as the first specified ground.29 However, the drafters have torn up the single prohibition in section 9(3) of the Constitution and created three separate provisions which appear at three different locations. There is a similar situation regarding the determination of unfairness. What the Constitution deals with in one section30 appears in several separate sections 26 This is what distinguishes the Equality Act from the Employment Equity Act as the latter does not feature such a reversed onus of proof. Indeed, the approach adopted there-examining reasonableness and justifiability within unfairness-also limits the scope of equality. However, the Employment Equity Act does not contradict itself in the way the Equality Act does, by first granting wider protection (by reversing the burden of proof) and then taking such wider protection away in the same test. of the Act. Thus section 7 prohibits unfair discrimination on the grounds of race whilst section 13(2)(a) read together with section l(l)(xxii)(a) states that if discrimination takes place on the specified ground of race it is presumed to be unfair. According to section 13(2)(a), in the same manner as the constitutional provision, the respondent has to rebut the presumption. In line with this, section 14 then lists what has to be taken into account when determining unfairness.31 This section was presumably intended to make it easier to reach decisions as to whether the burden of proof had been discharged by codifying the factors. However, it appears more confusing than the test as previously applied by the Constitutional Court. Section 14(2) determines that the context, and the factors listed in subsection (3)(a), as well as objectively determinable criteria intrinsic to the activity need to be taken into account. It may be commented, firstly, that listing the factors referred to in section 14(2)(b) separately in section 14(3) does not assist one's understanding. Secondly, the factors listed in section 14(3) are "objectively determinable criteria" according to which it is determined "whether the discrimination reasonably and justifiably differentiates between persons". Section 14(2)(c), which uses these words, is thus repetitive. Thirdly, section 14(1) expressly allows for affirmative action. However, this subsection again seems unnecessary and repetitive given that the factors for determining fairness listed in section 14(2) and (3) will preclude the affirmative action referred to from being held unfair. It may be that the drafters tried to make the enforcement of affirmative action policies easier by discouraging extensive analysis through the courts. However, this way limits scrutiny by the courts. Further, while international law imposes a limit on positive measures by providing that they must terminate as soon as the inequality is remedied,32 the South African provision has no similar limit.33 Section 7 lists some examples of unfair discrimination on the grounds of race.34 As regards these five forms of discrimination it does not appear possible to prove fairness in line with section 13(2)(a). Whatever the context35 or the factors determining the impact on the complainant,36 there is no possible argument to rebut the presumption of unfairness for propounding racial superiority or inferiority and racial violence,37 for racial exclusivity, direct38 or indirect,39 or for the denial of opportunities on the grounds of race.40 The provision of inferior 31 S. 14(1)-(3) EA.
32 Article 1(2) of the International Convention states: "Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved." 33 Clearly, such limit may be implied in the South African provision. 3 S. 7(a)-(e) EA. 35 S. 13(2)(a) EA. 36 S. 13(2)(b) read together with s. 13(3) EA. 37 S. 7(a) EA.
Introduction
The formal guarantee itself does not make racial equality work. This is illustrated by the United States' poor history of genuine racial equality in the early period of the constitutional equality guarantee.43 What is also needed is an institutional framework that is committed to the concept of racial equality. In the South African context, non-discrimination on the ground of race is meant to be implemented by so-called Equality Courts, supported by the South African Human Rights Commission, the Commission for Gender Equality, and the Equality Review Committee. In line with this, section 16 states: The relevant institutions thus consist of old and new elements, the courts being the inherited element with the Commission as well as the ERC being the newcomers. This marriage of old and new will be able to enforce racial equality only if the framework and the powers suit the country's specific needs. The formal structure of the enforcement mechanisms, the enforcement powers, and the public access to it must be examined.
Institutions
Enforcing the Act through magistrates' and high courts is practical and efficient. The court structure is available and the high number of courts ensure easy accessibility. Additionally, the court buildings are being refurbished and additional buildings are being built in rural areas.48 Given the ongoing financial constraints,49 the establishment of separate equality tribunals, which had also been a debated option,50 appears impractical as they would require the establishment of new structures besides the existing "normal" courts.
Even so, the use of the courts generates its own problems, not least the 
